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Abstract We explore the distribution of polarity items in antecedents of VP el-
lipsis. We show that the data can be derived from (i) the assumption that parts of
polarity items are not interpreted in situ (cf., e.g., Lahiri 1998) and (ii) the standard
assumptions about parallelism in ellipsis licensing (e.g., Rooth 1992, Fox 2000).
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1 Two puzzles about ellipsis and polarity
A well-formed VP may be elided (i.e., deleted at PF) if it is recoverable. Recover-
ability is standardly captured as a requirement that the elided VP, or some constituent
dominating it, stands in an appropriate matching relation with an antecedent con-
stituent in the discourse. A particularly influential characterization of this matching
relation has been put forward by Rooth (1992). A simplified version of it is provided
in (1) (see, e.g., Fox 2000 for details). (We will call the α and β constituents
‘parallelism domains’, PDA and PDE, respectively.)
(1) Parallelism Condition on VP Ellipsis:
a. A VP may be elided if it is reflexively dominated by a constituent α that
stands in a parallelism relation with a constituent β in the discourse.
b. A constituent α stands in a parallelism relation with a constituent β iff
[[β ]] ∈ F(α), where F(α) is the focus value of α .1
For illustration: the ellipsis of eat lunch in the second sentence of (2a) is licensed
because the sentence stands in a parallelism relation with the first sentence, i.e.,
because Parallelism is satisfied, as stated in (2c) (note that there may be further PDs
that satisfy Parallelism); the same would fail to hold for, say, eat something.
∗ Thanks to Danny Fox, Yosef Grodzinsky, Andreas Haida, and Kyle Johnson for valuable comments,
as well as the reviewers for and the audiences at the Workshop on Negation and Polarity (Hebrew
University in Jerusalem), GLOW 38 (University of Paris 8), and SALT 25 (Stanford University).
The research was supported by a grant from the GIF, the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific
Research and Development, and the Israel Science Foundation (ISF Grant 1926/14).
1 See, e.g., Rooth (1985) for a description of how focus values are computed. We represent focus
values by relying on the following convention: {ˆx eat lunch: x∈De} := {p: ∃x(p = ˆx eat lunch)}.
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(2) a. You didn’t eat lunch, but I did.
b. [neg [PDA you [VP eat lunch]]. [PDE IF [VP eat lunch]].
c. [[PDA]]∈F(PDE), i.e., [[you eat lunch]]∈{ˆx eat lunch: x∈De}
1.1 Polarity alternations
Many examples of VP ellipsis have been brought forward where the forms of the
elided and the antecedent VPs differ in their morphology but arguably not in their
semantics. Sag (1976) discusses examples like (3), in which the antecedent VP
contains the polarity item (PI) anything:
(3) John didn’t eat anything, but I did.
If the second VP in (3) contained anything, the sentence would not have been
well-formed (*I ate anything). Accordingly, Sag and others assumed that whatever
property of anything is responsible for it being a PI, it does not noticeably affect the
syntax and semantics of the VP containing the PI (at least not for the purposes of
ellipsis licensing). This assumption remains the gold standard when it comes to the
treatment of PIs in antecedents of VP ellipsis (see Merchant 2013 for an overview).2
(4) Standard assumption about PIs in antecedents of VP ellipsis:
Although ‘polarity features’ affect the distribution of the PIs that carry them,
they do not affect the semantics of the VPs in which they occur.
A VP containing anything, which denotes an existential quantifier (see, e.g.,
Ladusaw 1979), may thus be a licit antecedent to an elided VP containing something
in a parallel position. Put in terms we introduced above, the discourse in (3) satisfies
Parallelism because it has the following derivation (among others):
(5) a. You didn’t eat anything, but I did.
b. [neg [PDA you [VP eat anything]]. [PDE IF [VP eat something]].
c. [[PDA]]∈F(PDE), i.e., [[you eat anything]]∈{ˆx eat something: x∈De},
i.e., ˆyou eat something ∈ {ˆx eat something: x∈De}
In the remainder of the section we present data that appear to be at odds with the
combination of (1) and (4). Accordingly, one of these assumptions will have to be
supplanted, at least on the supposition that the PIs involved should not be analyzed
as being substantially different from those discussed by Sag and others.
2 For illustration, Merchant (2013) proposes that PIs have an unspecified polarity feature which gets
valued by a c-commanding polarity head, which is external to the VP. This process determines the
morphology of the PI, say, whether it is realized as anything or something.
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1.2 A puzzle involving free choice items
In addition to downward-entailing (DE) environments, anything may occur also
in the scope of existential modals. The occurrences of any in existential modal
environments have been referred to as ‘free choice any’: namely, they give rise to
the so-called free choice inference that, roughly, every element in the domain of
any verifies the statement (see, e.g., Dayal 1998, Menéndez-Benito 2010, Chierchia
2013, among many others). A felicitous occurrence of free choice any is exemplified
in (6a); a paraphrase of the free choice inference it induces is provided in (6b).
(6) a. John may/is allowed to eat any dessert.
b. ≈ Every dessert is such that John may eat it.
While free choice any may occur in existential modal environments, it appears
not to be acceptable in universal modal environments: the counterpart of (6) in which
any is embedded below a universal modal is infelicitous, given in (7).3
(7) #John must/has to eat any dessert.
It has been argued that free choice any, just as the occurrences of any in DE
environments, should be analyzed as involving existential quantification (see, e.g.,
Menéndez-Benito 2010, Chierchia 2013, Dayal 2013). If this assumption is correct,
and free choice any falls under the assumption in (4), then a VP containing an
occurrence of free choice any should be a licit antecedent for VP ellipsis if the elided
VP would contain some dessert in a position parallel to that of any dessert.
This expectation is not borne out: while a VP that is embedded under an existen-
tial modal can be elided, exemplified in (8a), a VP that is in an episodic environment
or is embedded under a universal modal cannot be, exemplified in (8bc). Plain
indefinites behave differently: the counterparts of (8bc) in which any dessert is
replaced with a/some dessert are judged as acceptable, given in (9).
(8) a. John may/is allowed to eat any dessert. Bill is also allowed to.
b. #John may/is allowed to eat any dessert. Bill (already) did.
c. #John may/is allowed to eat any dessert. Bill must/has to.
(9) a. John may/is allowed to eat a dessert. Bill is also allowed to.
b. John may/is allowed to eat a dessert. Bill (already) did.
c. John may/is allowed to eat a dessert. Bill must/has to.
3 This is an idealized description of the distribution of any in modal environments (see, e.g., Crnicˇ 2013
for some qualifications). We briefly discuss how potential occurrences of any in universal modals
statements could be captured in our account of polarity licensing in Section 2.2.
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Let us elaborate on why the pattern in (8) is unexpected. If we assume that free
choice any is an indefinite that is interpreted in situ and whose import is utilized by
some operator higher in the structure to yield the free choice inference, the discourse
in, say, (8b) may have the representation in (10) (the mechanism responsible for
the free choice inference is left unspecified here and a specific candidate for it will
be discussed in the following section; see also, e.g., Aloni 2007, Menéndez-Benito
2010, Chierchia 2013). Importantly, the PDE stands in a parallelism relation with
the PDA, which should suffice for the ellipsis to be licensed.4,5
(10) a. [... [may [PDA John eat any dessert]]. [PDE BillF eat a dessert].
b. [[PDA]]∈F(PDE), i.e., ˆJohn eat a dessert ∈ {ˆx eat a dessert: x∈De}
1.3 A puzzle involving negative polarity items
A puzzling pattern appears to emerge also with PIs in certain DE environments.
For example, if a VP containing any dessert is, say, in the scope of a DE attitude
predicate or a negated attitude predicate, the ellipsis of a VP containing some dessert
in a position parallel to that of any dessert need not be licensed. In particular, while
the ellipsis is licit with such antecedents if the elided VP is also embeded under an
attitude predicate, exemplified in (11), it is marked if the elided VP is unembedded.
(11) a. I am surprised that John ate any dessert, because I expect Sue did too.
b. I don’t think that John ate any dessert, but Sue thinks he did.
(12) a. #I am surprised that John ate any dessert, because Sue also did.
b. #I don’t think that John ate any dessert, but Sue did.
Plain indefinites behave differently: the counterparts of (12) that lack PIs in an-
tecedent VPs, given in (13), are judged as comparatively better.
(13) a. I am surprised that John ate a dessert, because Sue also did.
b. I don’t think that John ate a dessert, but Sue did.
4 Chierchia’s (2013) representation of the sentence with free choice any in (8) is more involved than
what we provide in (10), sketched in (ia). Cleary, Chierchia’s full proposal does not ceteris paribus
lead to a prediction that is different from the one we discuss in the main text:
(i) a. [OP [PDA [any dessert@] λ1 [♦ John eat t1]]].[PDE F/didF [BillF eat a dessert@]].
b. [[PDA]]∈F(PDE), i.e., ˆ♦(J. eat a dessert@)∈{ˆf(x eat a dessert@): f∈D(st)(st), x∈De}
5 A possible response to these data may be to adopt a universal-like analysis of free choice any, contra
Chierchia (2013) and others, and assume that the relevant ‘polarity features’ of free choice any, unlike
those of other occurrences of any, do affect the semantics of the VPs in relevant ways. We cannot do
justice to this response here due to space constraints but hope to return to it at another occasion.
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On the assumptions in (1) and (4), the discourses in (12) should satisfy Paral-
lelism. For illustration: the discourse in (12a) may have the representation in (14),
on which the PDA is in the focus value of PDE.
(14) a. [I am surprised [PDA John eat any dessert]]. [PDE SueF eat a dessert].
b. [[PDA]]∈F(PDE), i.e., ˆJohn eat a dessert ∈ {ˆx eat a dessert: x∈De}
1.4 A preview of the account
We have seen two types of examples that are unexpected on the combination of (1)
and (4). We argue for dropping the latter assumption. Instead, we submit that PIs in
antecedent VPs affect ellipsis resolution in ways similar to that of bound elements
(say, bound variables or traces). We show that this state of affairs may be predicted
on some recent approaches to polarity licensing.
More concretely, we propose that PIs (or one of their subconstituents) stand in a
dependency relation with an alternative-sensitive operator that c-commands the DE
(or non-monotone) environment in which the PIs are located. In this, we build on
the work of Krifka (1995), Chierchia (2013) and, especially, Lahiri (1998).
(15) [OP [... neg/surprise/etc. [... PI ...]]]
Now, if an antecedent VP contains an element that stands in such a dependency
relation with a c-commanding operator, then any PDA containing this VP will have
to contain this operator as well (for independently-motivated reasons). Accordingly,
the elided VP will have to be appropriately embedded to satisfy Parallelism.
(16) PDA: [OP [... neg/surprise/etc. [... PI ...]]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
the minimal size of PDA, as dictated
by independent principles of grammar
. PDE: ([OP) [X(F) [... Indef ...]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
the minimal size of PDE,
as dictated by Parallelism
.
In other words, the scope of the operator accompanying a PI in an antecedent VP
determines the lower bound on the size of the PDs. This lower bound is respected in
the acceptable examples discussed above but not in the unacceptable ones.
2 A theory of polarity licensing
We adopt a theory of polarity licensing that takes PIs like any to be existential
quantifiers that invoke logically stronger alternatives; these alternatives are used up
by an alternative-sensitive operator (e.g., Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998, Chierchia 2013).
For concreteness, we choose its implementation in Crnicˇ (2014).
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2.1 Negative polarity items
Basic assumptions. We propose that any NPs have the structure in (17). In
adopting this structure, we effectively follow Lahiri (1998) in taking PI distribution
to be tied to the distribution of covert even operator (see also Lee & Horn 1994), as
well as Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2013) in taking the alternatives invoked by PIs
to correspond to the subsets of the resource domains of PIs (these are their so-called
‘subdomain alternatives’).
(17) [[any [even≺ D]] NP]
More concretely: Any is a determiner that denotes an existential quantifier
corresponding to the denotation of a/some. Its slightly simplified meaning is in (18).
(18) [[any]] = λDet. λPet. λQ(e(st)). λws. ∃x(D(x) = P(x) = Q(x,w) = 1)
The sister of any at surface structure is [even≺ D], which is of type ((et)(st))(st).
Its meaning corresponds to an appropriate cross-categorial characterization of even
combined with the domain of any (cf. Rooth 1985, Ch. 4). In particular, even
presupposes that the proposition obtained by combining the domain of any with
the respective predicate over domains is ordered above the propositions obtained
by pointwise combining the alternatives to the domain of any (= its subsets) with
the predicate. The ordering relation, ≺, is determined by the context. It may be the
entailment relation, a ‘less-likely-than’ relation, etc.; for our purposes, it is only
crucial that logically weaker alternatives cannot be ordered above logically stronger
ones. (We represent p being ordered above q with ‘p≺q’.)
(19) [[even≺ D]] = λP(et)(st): ∀D’⊂D(P(D’) 6= P(D)→ P(D) ≺ P(D’)). P(D)
Given its type, [even≺ D] cannot be the first argument of any at LF: appropriate
type-shifting has to apply or the constituent has to move at LF to a position in
which it is interpretable, leaving behind an (et)-type trace. The choice between these
two options is ultimately not crucial for the purposes of this paper; for reasons of
familiarity, we opt for the second approach.6
Unacceptable occurrences of any. The assumptions above suffice to explain the
distribution and import of any. In particular, we obtain the prediction that any is
unacceptable if it occurs in an upward-entailing environment. For example, the
occurrence of any in (20a) is unacceptable. The LF of the sentence is provided in
6 Adopting a type-shifting approach, whatever is responsible for the disambiguating effects of the
quantifier scope relations in the PDA on ellipsis resolution could also be treated as responsible for the
effects of PIs (even) in the PDA on ellipsis resolution, analogously to our proposal in Section 3.
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(20b): [even≺ D] moves to adjoin to the matrix clause, where it is interpretable. (For
perspicuity, we represent indices on binders and bound variables but not on other
assignment-sensitive elements, unless this is crucial. See Heim & Kratzer 1998 for
details on interpreting such structures.)
(20) a. #John ate anything.
b. [even≺ D] [λ1 [John ate [any D1] thing]]
The presupposition triggered by even in this structure, given in (21a), is inconsistent:
namely, it holds that for any D’⊂D, that John ate something in D’ entails that John
ate something in D and must thus be ordered at least as high as it, contra (21a).
(21) a. #Prs: ∀D’⊂D: ˆJohn ate somethingD ≺ ˆJohn ate somethingD’
b. As: ˆJohn ate somethingD
Acceptable occurrences of any. If any is base-generated in a DE environment,
the presupposition triggered by even may be vacuous and, accordingly, any is pre-
dicted to be acceptable in this environment. For example, if the ordering relation of
even is resolved to the entailment relation, a sentence like (22a) triggers a vacuous
presupposition on the construal of even above negation, given in (22b): the presup-
position, given in (23a), is vacuous because negation and other DE operators license
inferences from supersets to subsets in their scope. Finally, the assertive import of
any is identical to that of other indefinites, as shown in (23b).
(22) a. John didn’t eat anything.
b. [even≺ D] [λ1 ¬ [John eat [any D1] thing]]
(23) a. Prs: ∀D’⊂D: ˆ¬(John ate somethingD) ≺ ˆ¬(John ate somethingD’)
b. As: ˆ¬(John ate somethingD)
Thus, the proposed analysis of any derives the desirable prediction that any is
acceptable in DE environments and unacceptable in upward-entailing environments.7
Another desirable consequence of the proposal is that any may be acceptable in
non-monotone environments as well (see Section 4 for discussion).
(24) Prediction of the proposal:
Any is acceptable in DE environments, unacceptable in upward-entailing
environments, and potentially acceptable in non-monotone environments.
7 Obviously, we are ignoring the more intricate aspects of the distribution of PIs, in particular, the
so-called Immediate Scope Constraint (Linebarger 1987).
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2.2 Free choice items
The analysis of any sketched above appears to run into a problem with free choice
occurrences of any, specifically, the fact that any is acceptable in existential modal
environments. This problem would be avoided if any – or its domain, to be precise –
could be shown not to be in an upward-entailing environment in these configurations.
And, indeed, taking the paraphrases of the felicitous sentences with free choice any
as a guide, it does not appear to be – e.g., what corresponds to the domain of any in
the paraphrase of (25a), in (25b), is in a DE environment (the restrictor of every).
(25) a. John may/is allowed to eat any dessert.
b. ≈ Every dessert is such that John may eat it.
Deriving free choice inferences. Following Fox (2007) and Chierchia (2013),
we assume that if the domain of an existential quantifier in an existential modal
environment is an associate of two recursively embedded exhaustification operators,
it gives rise to a free choice inference. For instance, consider (26), which contains a
plain indefinite but may still convey a free choice inference (Chierchia 2013).
(26) John may/is allowed too eat a dessert.
Possible reading: Every dessert is such that John may eat it.
The free choice inference of (26) is derived from the structure in (27), where
both exh operators associate with the domain of the existential quantifier, which in
turn invokes its subsets as alternatives.
(27) [exh C’] [exh C] [♦ [John eat [a D] dessert]]
The contribution of exh, described in (29), is to negate all the alternatives of its
prejacent that can be negated (specifically, all the alternatives that are “innocently
excludable” relative to the the set of alternatives and the prejacent, see Fox 2007; we
rely on an overly simplified representation of exhaustification in this paper).8
(28) exh(C,p,w) = 1 iff ∀q∈C: q(w) = 1→ p→q)
The free choice inference that is generated by (27) is provided in (29): for every
subset D’ of D, which includes singleton sets, John may eat some dessert in D’ (we
omit the computation here and refer the reader to Fox 2007, Chierchia 2013).
8 In line with our simplified treatment of exh in the main text, we leave aside issues involving dou-
ble exhaustification of domains of unembedded indefinites, which would ceteris paribus result in
indefinites having universal meanings. These issues can be avoided in a variety of different ways and
can be safely ignored for the purposes of this paper (see, e.g., Chierchia 2013, Singh, Wexler, Astle,
Kamawar & Fox 2013, Bar-Lev & Margulis 2013).
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(29) [[(27)]] = ˆ∀D’⊆D: ♦(John eat someD’ dessert)
Finally, it is important to highlight that the recursive exhaustification in (27)
is necessary: a representation of (26) that would contain a single exhaustification
operator would not yield the free choice inference (see, e.g., Fox 2007).
PIs in existential modal environments. Returning to free choice any, if the sen-
tence in (30a) is parsed as in (30b), where [even≺ D] takes scope above the two
exh operators that associate with the domain of any (i.e., the trace of [even≺ D]), it
triggers the presupposition in (31a) and has the assertive meaning in (31b).
(30) a. John may/is allowed to eat any dessert.
b. [even≺ D] [λ1 [[exh C’] [exh C] [♦ [John eat [any D1] dessert]]]]
(31) a. Prs: ∀D’⊂D: ˆ∀D”⊆D: ♦(John eat someD” dessert)
≺ ˆ∀D”⊆D’: ♦(John eat someD” dessert)
b. As: ˆ∀D’⊆D: ♦(John eat someD’ dessert)
The presupposition in (31a) is vacuous. A shortcut to recognizing this is by focusing
on the occurrences of D and D’ in (31a): they occur in the restrictor of a universal
quantifier, which as a DE environment licenses inferences from supersets to subsets.
Accordingly, if the ordering of even is resolved to entailment, the presupposition it
triggers is a tautology. This explains the acceptability and context-independence of
any in existential modal environments.
PIs in universal modal environments. We have observed that occurrences of any
are not acceptable in the scope of universal modals.
(32) #John must/has to eat any dessert.
This state of affairs is predicted only partly by the proposal described above.
Specifically, the sentence in (32) may have the representation in (33), where exh
associates with the domain of any. The exhaustification of the domain of any leads
to the proposition that John must eat some dessert and that every dessert is such that
he is allowed to eat it, as stated in (34). Note that double exhaustification would not
affect the meaning of the sentence (see Fox 2007).
(33) [even≺ D] [λ1 [[exh C] [ [John eat [any D1] dessert]]]]
(34) As: ˆ(John eat someD dessert) & ∀D’⊆D: ♦(John eat someD’ dessert)
The presupposition induced by even in (33), given in (35), is contradictory if the
ordering relation of even is resolved to entailment: namely, the alternatives that we
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obtain from the pointwise combination of the predicate over domains and the subsets
of D are mutually exclusive and thus cannot be ordered according to entailment.
This should prima facie suffice for explaining the markedness of (32).9
(35) Prs: ∀D’⊂D: ˆ(John eat someD dessert) & ∀D”⊆D: ♦(John eat someD”
dessert) ≺ ˆ(J. eat someD’ dessert) & ∀D”⊆D’: ♦(J. eat someD” dessert)
However, recall that the ordering relation of even need not be resolved to entail-
ment. In particular, if it is resolved to some other relation, say, a ‘less-likely-than’
relation, the sentence in (32) would ceteris paribus trigger a contingent presuppo-
sition. While this may be desirable – there may be felicitous occurrences of PIs in
what can be characterized as universal modal environments (see Crnicˇ 2013 for a
preliminary discussion) –, we submit here that such presuppositions, which order
mutually exclusive modal statements, are not easy to evaluate (satisfy, accommo-
date) in natural contexts. We suggest that for this reason PIs tend to be perceived
as marked in universal modal environments. We hope to more fully address these
issues in the future (see, e.g., Menéndez-Benito 2010, Chierchia 2013 for different
takes on free choice any in universal modal environments).
Summary. We proposed that the resource domain of any is an argument of covert
even (cf. Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998). Accordingly, it cannot be interpreted in situ.
We obtain a felicitous interpretation only if even combined with the domain of any
moves to a position in which its presupposition can be satisfied. If the PI occurs in a
DE environment, even has to take scope above the DE environment; if it occurs in a
modal environment, even has to take scope above the modal and exh operators.
3 Parallelism and polarity
3.1 Sag’s example
With the above account of polarity licensing in hand, let us revisit the standard
example of polarity alternation in VP ellipsis:
(3) John didn’t eat anything, but I did.
Given our proposal, the first sentence of the discourse has the structure in (22)
and the interpretation in (23), repeated below. Its assertive meaning is simply that
John did not eat a thing, while the presupposition induced by even is vacuous, at
least if the ordering relation of even is resolved to entailment.
9 Note that if no exhaustification applies in (32), even will trigger a contradictory presupposition no
matter what scope it takes since the PI is in an upward-entailing environment.
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(22) a. John didn’t eat anything.
b. [even≺ D] [λ1 ¬ [John eat [any D1] thing]]
(23) a. Prs: ∀D’⊂D: ˆ¬(John ate somethingD) ≺ ˆ¬(John ate somethingD’)
b. As: ˆ¬(John ate somethingD)
If the PDA is the entire first sentence in (3), as in (36a), the focus value of the second
sentence, with the focus on I and did, as in (36b), will contain the meaning of the
PDE, as stated in (37) (did may be less prominent than I at PF for independent
reasons): namely, since the presupposition of even in the first sentence is vacuous,
the import of the PI in the antecedent VP effectively corresponds to that of other
indefinites, say, something.
(36) a. [PDA [even≺ D] [λ1 ¬ [John eat [any D1] thing]].
b. [PDE didF [IF eat [some D] thing]]
(37) [[PDA]] ∈ F(PDE), i.e., ˆ¬(John eat somethingD) ∈ {ˆf(x eat somethingD):
f∈D(st)(st), x∈De}
This means that there is a derivation of (3) that satisfies Parallelism, which
accounts for the felicity of Sag’s examples. It is worth higlighting that this example
illustrates that Parallelism can be satisfied even if not every element in the PDA has
a parallel counterpart in the PDE (and vice versa). But this may obtain only if the
import of the extra elements is vacuous, as is the case with even in (36).
3.2 Further data involving negative polarity items
Felicitous discourses. If the antecedent VP containing a PI is not embedded in the
immediate scope of negation, but rather in the scope of a different DE operator, say,
surprise, Parallelism will trivially be satisfied if the elided VP is embedded in the
scope of an operator that has surprise as a focus alternative. This is the case in (38).
(38) I am surprised that John ate any dessert, because I expect that Sue did too.
A derivation of (38) that satisfies Parallelism is provided in (39). While in the PDA
even scopes above the DE operator and triggers a vacuous presupposition, no such
operator needs to be present in the PDE, where focus is on Sue and expect.
(39) a. [PDA [even≺ D] λ1 [I am surprised that John ate [any D1] dessert]]
b. [PDE I expectF that SueF ate [some D] dessert]
(40) [[PDA]] ∈ F(PDE), i.e., ˆI am surprised that John ate someD dessert ∈ {ˆV(I,
x ate someD dessert): V∈D(st)(e(st)), x∈De}
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Infelicitous discourses. If the elided VP is not embedded in the scope of expres-
sions that have John is surprised as an alternative, the sentence is marked:
(41) #I am surprised that John ate any dessert, because Sue also did.
This is ceteris paribus unexpected on what we have said above. Specifically, there is
a derivation of (41) on which the discourse should be felicitous. It is exemplified in
(42): crucially, the bound domain variable and the domain argument of even in the
PDA are co-indexed with the domain of any in the PDE.
(42) a. [even≺ D9] [λ9 [I am surprised that [PDA John ate [any D9] dessert]]]
b. [PDE SueF eat [some D9] dessert]
Due to the advantageous choice of indices, the antecedent VP and the elided VP have
the same meaning in (42) (on every variable assignment). Accordingly, Parallelism
is trivially satisfied and the discourse is incorrectly predicted to be felicitous.
(43) [[PDA]]∈[[PDE]], i.e., ˆJohn ate someD dessert∈{ˆx eat someD dessert: x∈De}
No Meaningless Coindexing. However, it has been independently observed that
coindexing of the sort in (42) is problematic and must be ruled out. Namely, VPs
containing bound variables are well-known for imposing special constraints on
ellipsis resolution. For example, consider the example in (44a) on the bound reading
of the pronoun in the first sentence. This binding configuration constrains the
interpretation of the elided VP: roughly, the binder of the variable in the elided VP
must be in a structurally parallel position to that of the quantifier in the first sentence.
(44) a. Every boy1 allowed Sue to eat his1 dessert. John did too.
b. Available reading: John2 allowed Sue to eat his2 dessert.
c. Unavailable reading: John2 ate his2 dessert.
If the sentences in (44a) had the representations in (45), and the VPs were chosen as
the PDs, Parallelism would be trivially satisfied – namely, the VPs are identical.
(45) a. [Every boy λ1 [t1 allowed Sue to [PDA eat his1 dessert]]].
b. [John λ1 [t1 [PDE eat his1 dessert]]].
c. [[PDA]] = [[PDE]] ∈ F(PDE)
To avoid this undesirable prediction, it has been stipulated that two variables
may have the same index only if they are both free or they have the same binder:
(46) No Meaningless Coindexing (Heim 1997):
If an LF contains an occurrence of a variable X bound by a node Z, then all
occurrences of X must be bound by the node Z.
12
Ellipsis, Parallelism, and Polarity
The state of affairs described in (44) can now be captured: the problematic
representation in (45) is ruled out, and while a representation with different indices
(say, 2 instead of 1 in (45b)) would be legitimate, it obviously would not satisfy
Parallelism. This leaves only the representations in (47) as possible representations
of (44a), yielding the observed reading (we assume that F(John) includes quantifiers).
(47) a. [PDA Every boy λ1 [t1 allowed Sue to eat his1 dessert]].
b. [PDE JohnF λ2 [t2 allowed Sue to eat his2 dessert]].
c. [[PDA]] ∈ F(PDE), i.e., ˆevery boy1 allowed Sue to eat pro1’s dessert ∈
{ˆx1 allowed Sue to eat pro1’s dessert: x∈D(e(st))(st), x∈De}
To sum up: A consequence of No Meaningless Coindexing is that whenever an
antecedent VP contains a bound variable, its binder must be contained in the PDA,
unless the elided VP contains a variable in a parallel position that is bound by the
same binder; this in turn constrains the size and form of the PDE. This consequence
of No Meaningless Coindexing plays an essential role in our account.
Back to infelicitous discourses. Given No Meaningless Coindexing, represen-
tation (42) is ruled out: free and bound variables cannot share an index. Instead,
all legitimate representations of discourse (41) have a form along the lines of (48),
where the index on the bound variable, 1, differs from that on the free variables, 9.
(48) a. [PDA [even≺ D9] λ1 [I am surprised that John ate [any D1] dessert]]
b. [PDE didF [SueF ate [some D9] dessert]
On the assumption that did does not have John is surprised as an alternative, which
seems plausible, the focus value of the second sentence of (41), given in (48b), fails
to contain the meaning of the PDA, in violation of Parallelism.10 Accordingly, we
correctly predict that the discourse in (41) will be infelicitous.
(49) [[PDA]] 6∈ F(PDE), i.e., ˆI am surprised that John ate someD dessert 6∈ {ˆf(x
ate someD dessert): f∈D(st)(st), x∈De}
Summary. We have shown that together with Parallelism and No Meaningless
Coindexing, an analysis that takes PIs to have a component that is interpreted ex situ,
first, correctly accounts for the original examples by Sag and, second, leads to novel
predictions that appear to be borne out.
10 If did were to have John is surprised as an alternative (cf. Han & Romero 2004), Parallelism could
be satisfied. Indeed, the prediction of our account is that to the extent a speaker can accommodate
John is surprised as an alternative to did, they will find the discourse in (41) acceptable.
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3.3 Data involving free choice items
Felicitous examples. Consider the following discourse, repeated from above:
(50) John may/is allowed to eat any dessert. Bill is also allowed to.
This discourse is trivially predicted to be acceptable. For instance, take the derivation
in (51): the PDA contains even and two exh operators that associate with the domain
of any; the PDE contains two exh operators that associate with the domain of some.
(51) a. [PDA [even≺ D] [λ1 [[exh C’] [exh C] [♦ [John eat [any D1] dessert]]]]]
b. [PDE [exh C’] [exh C] [♦ [BillF eat [some D] dessert]]]
Since the import of even is vacuous in (51a), these structures satisfy Parallelism (i.e.,
an occurrence of even in the PDE is optional and undetectable):
(52) [[PDA]] ∈ F(PDE), i.e., ˆ∀D’⊆D: ♦(John eat someD’ dessert)) ∈ {ˆ∀D’⊆D:
♦(x eat someD’ dessert): x∈De}
Infelicitous examples (universal modals). An elided VP that occurs in the scope
of a universal modal and whose antecedent contains free choice any is marked:
(53) #John may/is allowed to eat any dessert. Bill must/has to.
This may at first seem to be unexpected on our proposal. Namely, the discourse
in (53) could be assigned the derivation in (54). On this derivation, the second
sentence contains two exh operators associating with the domain of the indefinite in
the elided VP; as discussed in the preceding section, its meaning is consistent – Bill
has to eat some dessert and every dessert is such that Bill may eat it.
(54) a. [PDA [even≺ D] [λ1 [[exh C’] [exh C] [♦ [John eat [any D1] dessert]]]]]
b. [PDE [exh C’] [exh C] [F [BillF eat [some D] dessert]]]
Since the subject and the universal modal are focused in (54b), Parallelism is satis-
fied. (We are not representing all the focus alternatives of (54b) in (55) for brevity.)
(55) [[PDA]] ∈ F(PDE), i.e., ˆ∀D’⊆D: ♦(John eat someD’ dessert) ∈ {ˆ∀D’⊆D:
♦(x eat someD’ dessert), ... : x∈De}
However, the structure in (54b), which is required by Parallelism, is ruled out
for independent reasons. In particular, as we alluded to in the preceding section, the
second exhaustification operator is vacuous in this structure: since the subdomain
alternatives to the structure with a single exh are all mutually exclusive, their negation
is trivially entailed by the structure with a single exh.
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(56) [[[exh C’] [exh C] [F [BillF eat [a D] dessert]]]
= [[[exh C] [F [BillF eat [a D] dessert]]]
Now, structures in which exh is vacuous have been argued by Fox & Spector
(2009) and others to be illicit: they run afoul of the Economy Condition on the
distribution of exh (see Fox & Spector 2009 for a stronger statement of the condition).
(57) Economy Condition:
An occurrence of exh is licit only if it is contained in a constituent whose
meaning is distinct from the meaning of its counterpart without exh.
Thus, the parse of the second sentence in (53) that is required by Parallelism,
given in (54b), is unavailable. The licit structures with a single exh operator or
without any exh operator, on the other hand, do not satisfy Parallelism. Namely,
the meaning that we obtain by a double exhaustification of the domain of any in
an existential modal environment, which is required in the first sentence of (53), is
not identical to the meaning that we obtain by a single or no exhaustification, as
captured in (58) (see esp. Fox 2007). Accordingly, we are forced to conclude that
Parallelism cannot be satisfied in (53) without violating an independent principle of
grammar, which explains its infelicity.
(58) ˆ∀D’⊆D: ♦(John eat a dessert in D’)
6∈ F([exh C] [F [BillF eat [a D] dessert]])
6∈ F([F [BillF eat [a D] dessert]])
Infelicitous examples (no embedding). An identical state of affairs obtains if the
elided VP is unembedded, as shown in (60): the only configuration that could satisfy
Parallelism violates the Economy Condition. Specifically, in order for its focus value
to contain the meaning of the PDA, the PDE would have to contain two exh operators
associating with the domain of the indefinite, given in (59b). However, both exh
operators would be vacuous in such a configuration (see also fn. 8).
(59) #John may/is allowed to eat anything. Bill (already) did.
(60) a. [PDA [even≺ D] [λ1 [[exh C’] [exh C] [♦ [John eat [any D1] dessert]]]]]
b. [PDE [exh C’] [exh C] [didF [BillF eat [a D] dessert]]]
Summary. Since free choice any requires even that accompanies it to scope above
two exh operators in existential modal sentences, both PDA and PDE will have to
contain two exh operators. The PDE will be licit if the elided VP is embedded below
an existential modal, but not if the elided VP is embedded below a universal modal or
is unembedded – namely, in the latter case, the structure with two exh operators will
violate the Economy Condition. We thus obtain the generalization in (61), where a
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PI is ‘licensed’ in an environment iff even that takes the PI’s domain as an argument
triggers a presupposition that is satisfied in the context.
(61) Generalization:
If the antecedent of VP ellipsis contains a PI, the PDA must dominate a
constituent in which the PI is licensed, which constrains PDEs.
4 Some predictions
The proposal has many predictions. However, due to space limitations, we will
only explore some of those here, namely, those pertaining to examples in which an
antecedent VP containing a PI is in a non-monotone environment.
PIs in non-monotone environments. In all the examples that we have looked at
so far, the presupposition of even accompanying a PI was trivial. But this need not
always be the case. In particular, it is not the case if the PI occurs in a non-monotone
environment (see, e.g., Linebarger 1987, Rothschild 2006, Crnicˇ 2014 for discussion
of PIs in non-monotone environments). An example of a felicitous occurrence of
any in such an environment is provided in (62).
(62) Exactly 2 congressmen read anything (at all) last year.
The presupposition induced by even is not vacuous in (62). The structure and the
meaning of (62) are provided in (63), where the ordering relation of even is plausibly
resolved to a ‘less-likely-than’ relation. The presupposition is satisfied in natural
contexts because, roughly, while we may expect a small number of congressmen to
read something from a subset D’ of D, we expect a bigger number of congressmen
to read something from the set D itself (see Crnicˇ 2014 for extensive discussion).
(63) a. [even≺ D] λ1 [exactly 2 congressmen read [any D1] thing]
b. Prs: ∀D’⊆D: ˆexactly 2 congressmen read somethingD
≺ ˆexactly 2 congressmen read somethingD’
Predictions (simple felicitous examples). If an antecedent VP contains a PI and
occurs in a non-monotone environment, the presupposition induced by even in the
PDA will thus not be vacuous. Accordingly, Parallelism can be satisfied only if even
occurs also in the PDE (otherwise the focus alternatives of the PDE will fail to trigger
the presupposition triggered by the PDA). Consider (64).
(64) Exactly 2 congressmen read anything last year. Exactly 4 did this year.
The discourse is predicted to be felicitous on the derivation in (65), where both the
PDA and the PDE contain even and where the numeral (and the temporal modifier) is
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focused – the meaning of the PDA is thus clearly contained in the focus value of the
PDE. Moreover, the presupposition induced by even is felicitous in both sentences.
(65) a. [PDA [even≺ D] λ1 [exactly 2 congressmen read [any D1] thing]]
b. [PDE [even≺ D] λ2 [exactly 4F congressmen read [some D2] thing]]
Predictions (simple infelicitous examples). If we replace the subject of the sec-
ond sentence in (64) with a proper name, the prediction is that the discourse will
become marked. This seems to be case, as suggested by the contrast in (66).
(66) a. Exactly 2 congressmen read a novel last year. Sue did too.
b. Exactly 2 congressmen read any novel last year. #Sue did too.
Parallelism would be satisfied in (66b) on the derivation in (67), where Sue
would induce exactly two congressmen as an alternative and where, again, even is
contained in both the PDA and the PDE.
(67) a. [PDA [even≺ D] λ1 [exactly 2 congressmen read [any D1] thing]]
b. [PDE [even≺ D] λ2 [SueF read [some D2] thing]]
However, as we have seen in Section 2, the presupposition of even in (67b) is
unsatisfiable, resulting in the unacceptability of the sentence. On the other hand, if
the PDE were generated without even, it would not induce an alternative that would
correspond to the PDA, since even in the PDA induces a contingent presupposition.
Predictions (complex felicitous examples). We conclude the section by looking
at discourses like the ones above but in which the elided VP is embedded in a DE
environment. In such cases, the presuppositions of potential occurrences of covert
even in the second sentence can be satisfied and so the discourses are predicted to be
felicitous. This indeed seems to be the case:
(68) a. Exactly 2 congressmen read any novel last year. No one else did.
b. Exactly 2 congressmen read any novel last year. Sue, of course, didn’t.
We illustrate the prediction on (68a): the discourse may be assigned the deriva-
tion in (69), where both the PDA and the PDE contain even and where no one has
exactly 2 congressmen as an alternative.
(69) a. [PDA [even≺ D] λ1 [exactly 2 congressmen read [any D1] thing]]
b. [PDE [even≺ D] λ2 [no oneF read [some D2] thing]]
The structures in (69) satisfy Parallelism, and the presupposition of even in (69b) is
met in natural contexts (≺ must be resolved to a ‘less-likely-than’ relation).
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Summary. We explored some predictions of our proposal involving antecedent
VPs that contain a PI and occur in a non-monotone environment. In such cases, even
induces a contingent presupposition. Parallelism then necessitates even to be present
in the PDE as well. This may result in a felicitous interpretation of the PDE only if
the elided VP occurs in the scope of an appropriate non-monotone or a DE operator.
5 Conclusion and outlook
If parts of PIs must be interpreted ex situ, we expect the import of PIs in ellipsis
licensing to be similar to that of bound variables. We argued that this expectation is
borne out and can be detected with occurrences of PIs whose licensing environments
are larger than the minimal clauses in which they occur. In the following, we mention
some of the issues that we hope to investigate in the future.
Variation across languages and PIs. We focused solely on the behavior of any
in this paper. The predictions of the proposal with respect to other PIs depend on the
syntactic and semantic properties of these items. For example, it has been noted that
some PIs are more restricted than any in both their distribution and their behavior in
ellipsis contexts. This is illustrated by the following contrast in the behavior of any
and that of in ages and all that smart (Collins & Postal 2014).
(70) a. A: Nobody talked to anyone here. B: John did.
b. A: Nobody talked to Sue in ages. B: #John did.
c. A: Nobody here is all that smart. B: #John is.
There is a variety of possible responses to such data. For example, it is possible
that in ages and all the smart do not have non-PI alternatives, or that they may
induce presuppositions that are not vacuous in DE environments and thus need to be
generated in PDEs, etc. While we cannot explore these options here, we hope to do
so elsewhere. Similarly, the distribution of different kinds of PIs in ellipsis licensing
contexts should be investigated cross-linguistically, potentially shedding new light
on both the nature of PIs in those languages and the nature of ellipsis.
Accommodation. As pointed out above, the predictions of our proposal obtain
to the extent that the alternatives to the elements in PDEs are restricted in the
way we assumed (say, that focus on did does not induce John is surprised as an
alternative). While our assumptions may be plausible and appear to obtain with the
native English speakers we consulted (and our reviewers), some speakers may be able
to accommodate appropriate, more complex objects as alternatives. The behavior of
these speakers would then be expected to differ from that of other speakers.
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